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Tourism studies have shown a growing interest in the relationship between tourism and
the economy, with relevant work exploring the causal direction of effects between a country’s
international tourism presence and its overall economic performance (see, Schubert et al., 2011;
Chatziantoniou et al., 2013; Ivanov and Webster, 2013; Antonakakis et al., 2015, among others).
The product of this enquiry is a mosaic of different, often opposing interpretations (e.g. tourism–
led growth against economy–driven tourism) that render this area of research inconclusive and
still open to discussion.
In their majority, relevant studies focus on specific destinations. However, a cross–sectional
analysis of the tourism–economy dynamics allows for a more in–depth and comparative exam-
ination of different states (Dritsakis, 2012). In addition, it is plausible to argue that the use
of panel data can decrease endogeneity through the consideration of specific country effects,
omitted variables, reverse causality and measurement error. In this respect, some papers (See-
tanah, 2011; Chang et al., 2012) explore multiple countries classified on certain criteria, mostly
geographic or economic. This study introduces another factor to the said enquiry that has so far
been neglected, namely, the destinations’ quality of political institutions (or political regime).
The political economy literature has long established the effects of institutional quality on
the relationship between economic growth and economic resources (see, inter alia, Rodriguez
and Sachs, 1999; Mehlum et al., 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2008). Thus, we postulate that political
regime (as approximated by the level of democracy) in a particular country can influence the
∗Webster Vienna University, Department of Business & Management, Praterstrasse 23, 1020, Vienna, Austria.
†University of Portsmouth, Economics and Finance Subject Group, Portsmouth Business School, Portland
Street, Portsmouth, PO1 3DE, United Kingdom.
‡University College London (UCL), Institute for Sustainable Heritage, The Bartlett, UCL Faculty of the Built
Environment, Central House, 14 Upper Woburn Place, WC1H 0NN, London, UK.
§Bournemouth University, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Executive Business Centre, 89
Holdenhurst Road, BH8 8EB, Bournemouth, UK.
¶Bournemouth University, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Executive Business Centre, 89
Holdenhurst Road, BH8 8EB, Bournemouth, UK.
1
economy–tourism relationship. Consequently, the aim of this paper is to examine the dynamic
links between tourism and economic growth in 98 countries, classified according to the quality
of their political institutions, over the period 1995-2011, using a panel Vector Autoregressive
(VAR) approach.
The quality of the political institutions is approximated based on the scores provided by
the Polity IV index (www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). Countries are classified as
democratic and non–democratic (see Table 1). Non–democratic classification denotes authori-
tarian or hybrid regimes (i.e. a mix of anocratic and autocratic regimes), whereas democratic
classification includes the democratic and full democratic political systems.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Furthermore, tourism income (proxied, for robustness purposes, by per capita international
tourism receipts, ITRCPT , per capita tourism expenditures, ITEXP , and per capita tourist
arrivals, ITARR) and per capita real GDP (in 2005 US$, GDPPC) are obtained from the World
Development Indicators database. The data sample is purely dictated by data availability.
Clearly, the relationship between tourism and economic growth is a process that takes place
over time, thereby necessitating a dynamic rather static framework. Therefore studies focusing
on the steady-state or long-run relationship between the two variables can mostly provide a
partial understanding of this complex relationship. In contrast, our dynamic analysis allows for
capturing the adjustment in tourism and economic growth transpiring over time.
In particular, the output of the panel VAR model enables us to construct panel impulse
response functions that illustrate the time path of tourism (economic growth) following a shock
to economic growth (tourism). We therefore can observe the whole dynamic process from the
initial shock to the long-run steady-state of the series of interest.
The panel VAR methodology combines the traditional VAR approach, which treats all the
variables in the system as endogenous. Further, the panel-data approach allows for detecting
any unobserved individual heterogeneity. In its general form, our model is the following:
∆ lnYit = A0 +A1∆ lnYit−1 +A2∆ lnYit−2 + ...+Aj∆ lnYit−j +BXit + µi + λt + εit (1)
where Yit is a vector of our key variables: ITRCPT and GDPPC. We apply the Panel VAR on
the first difference (∆) of the natural logarithm (ln) of the series instead of on the level series of
the aforementioned endogenous variables, as according to Table 2, the former series are station-
2
ary, while the latter are not. The autoregressive structure of model (1) allows all endogenous
variables to enter the model with a number of j lags. The number of lags is determined with
the use of the Akaike Information Criterion. Xit is a vector of the exogenous variables, which
are used as control variables, comprising: (i) labour force participation rate, capturing labour
input, (ii) gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP, measuring capital input, and (iii) imports
plus exports over GDP, capturing the degree of trade openness. The data for the exogenous
variables come also from the World Development Indicators database. µi and λt denote country
fixed-effects and time fixed-effects, respectively, and εit is the error term.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Descriptive statistics of the endogenous variables (both in levels and in their growth rates)
are presented in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
We begin our panel VAR analysis with the full sample results illustrated in Figure 1. Our
analysis is based on international tourism receipts as a proxy for tourism growth (as the results
based on other proxies are qualitatively similar and available upon request).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
We observe that, although there is a bidirectional relationship between tourism and economic
growth in the short-run (i.e. during the first four years), in the long-run this turns into an
economy–driven. Nevertheless, the consideration of the full sample can only lead us to draw
some tentative conclusions, as the special qualities of our sample countries remain unmasked.
Therefore, we need to observe the panel VAR results of countries classified by their level of
democracy, as shown in Figure 2. As aforementioned, we have two classifications reflecting the
different levels of political regimes.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
As shown in Figure 2, an Economic–Driven Tourism Growth relationship is witnessed in
countries with authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Non–democratic countries). The interpretation
of such finding is twofold; first, it can be argued that in many instances authoritarian prac-
tices create a turbulent environment for economic activities and hence, for all economic sectors
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including tourism (Fletcher and Morakabati, 2008). This incurs in non–democratic regimes
as governments often employ a rent–seeking behaviour to gain political support rather than
providing public goods (Plu¨mper and Martin, 2003).
Second, it has been established by the political economy literature that it is common for
economies which lack democracy to be controlled by a single individual or a small group of
individuals. Such power imbalances hinder the economy to grow or spread the benefits of
economic activity across society due to corruption (de Vaal and Ebben, 2011; Drury et al., 2006;
Mo, 2001). Thus, we maintain that the way that the economy is controlled in nondemocratic
states influences tourism growth negatively.
In contrast, countries with democracy or full democracy exhibit a bidirectional relationship.
It is suggested that countries with democratic regimes are able to exploit the maximum capacity
of their economies and consequently, are at a good position to support investment in their various
sectors. Moreover, given that the benefits from each sector can be shared more fairly across
society it is reasonable to argue that sectoral performance (in our case, tourism) could assist
economic growth.
In short, these results highlight the importance of panel country investigation of the tourism–
economy relationship based on criteria that move away from geographic and economic charac-
teristics.
An interesting avenue for further research is to examine whether the tourism-growth nexus is
sensitive to alternative country groupings based on the level of government effectiveness, tourism
specialisation, or the degree of tourism competitiveness.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses based on the full sample estimation for the period 1995-2011
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Note: GDPPCGR and ITRCPTGR denote per capita real GDP growth and per capita international tourism
receipts growth, respectively.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses for the political regime classifications estimation for the period
1995-2011
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Note: Impulse responses for Non–democratic and Democratic classifications are shown in the top and lower panels,
respectively. GDPPCGR and ITRCPTGR denote per capita real GDP growth and per capita international
tourism receipts growth, respectively.
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Table 1: Democratic and Non–democratic countries
Democratic Countries Acronym Non–democratic Countries Acronym
Albania ALB Algeria DZA
Australia AUS Angola AGO
Ausria AUT Armenia ARM
Belgium BEL Azerbaijan AZE
Bolivia BOL Bahrain BHR
Brazil BRA Bangladesh BGD
Bulgaria BGR Belarus BLR
Canada CAD Burundi BDI
Cape Verde CPV Cambodia KHM
Chile CHL China CHN
Colombia COL Croatia HRV
Costa Rica CRI Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY
Cyprus CYP Ethiopia ETH
Czech Republic CZE Ghana GHA
Denmark DNK Indonesia IDN
Dominican Republic DOM Jordan JOR
Equador ECU Kazakhstan KAZ
El Salvador SLV Kenya KEN
Estonia EST Kyrgyz Republic KGZ
Finland FIN Lao PDR LAO
France FRA Malaysia MYS
Germany GER Morocco MAR
Greece GRE Nepal NPL
Guatemala GTM Pakistan PAK
Honduras HND Russian Federation RUS
Hungary HUN Sierra Leone SLE
India IND Singapore SGP
Israel ISR Sri Lanka LKA
Italy ITA Sudan SDN
Japan JPN Tanzania TZA
Korea, Republic KOR Tunisia TUN
Latvia LVA Yemen, Rep. YEM
Lesotho LSO
Lithuania LTU
Macedonia, FYR MKD
Malawi MWI
Mali MLI
Mauritius MUS
Mexico MEX
Moldova MDA
Mongolia MNG
Namibia NAM
Netherlands NLD
New Zealand NZL
Nicaragua NIC
Norway NOR
Panama PAN
Paraguay PRY
Peru PER
Philippines PHL
Poland POL
Portugal PRT
Romania ROM
Slovak Republic SVK
Slovenia SVN
South Africa ZAF
Spain ESP
Sweden SWE
Switzerland CHE
Thailand THA
Turkey TUR
Ukraine UKR
United Kingdom GBR
United States USA
Uruguay URY
Venezuela, RB VEN
Notes: The classification of the countries follows the Polity IV index
(www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.. Democratic countries have a score between 6 and 10, whereas
Non–democratic countries have a score between -10 and 5.
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Table 2: Panel unit root test results
H0: Unit root
Variables LLC IPS
All countries GDPPC 14.3898 [1.0000] 13.9554 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.32751 [1.0000] 12.3689 [1.0000]
ITEXP 9.91348 [1.0000] 13.8862 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 9.37332 [1.0000] 15.7990 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -24.3474*** [0.0000] -16.8728*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -28.1292*** [0.0000] -23.0880*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -28.7641*** [0.0000] -23.3049*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -26.6004*** [0.0000] -21.6964*** [0.0000]
Democratic GDPPC 16.7352 [1.0000] 13.0879 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.45275 [1.0000] 10.0132 [1.0000]
ITEXP 10.0450 [1.0000] 9.70755 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 7.74476 [1.0000] 10.8190 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -15.4104*** [0.0000] -10.9596*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -13.0589*** [0.0000] -11.6446*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.7357*** [0.0000] -12.7005*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.5360*** [0.0000] -12.0579*** [0.0000]
Non–democratic GDPPC 6.27527 [1.0000] 10.9565 [1.0000]
ITARR 4.30978 [1.0000] 7.73564 [1.0000]
ITEXP 5.03177 [1.0000] 8.60994 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 4.80054 [1.0000] 8.51076 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -15.4186*** [0.0000] -10.8160*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -19.8876*** [0.0000] -14.6368*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -17.8061*** [0.0000] -13.6684*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.8223*** [0.0000] -12.7198*** [0.0000]
The numbers in brackets denote p-values. The LLC and IPS tests are the panel unit root test of Levin et al. (2002)
and Im et al. (2003), respectively, performed using the Newey–West bandwidth selection with Barlett Kernel, and
the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion is used to determine to optimal lag length. *, ** and *** indicate rejection of
the null hypothesis at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Full sample & by political regime
All (98) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 11494.08 87716.7 125.267 15058.36 1.805935 6.176781 1851.967* 1921
ITARR 0.899331 103.5508 0.001305 2.757344 27.56917 1004.059 80454658* 1921
ITEXP 1157.565 1298055 0.931889 29622.63 43.71802 1914.489 2.93E+08* 1921
ITRCPT 950.1868 310652.3 0.211532 7193.892 41.58684 1789.989 2.56E+08* 1921
GDPPCGR 0.026852 0.322496 -0.192922 0.039761 -0.063636 8.598306 2362.244* 1808
ITARRGR -0.027283 1.285837 -3.187505 0.228891 -3.931493 50.49608 174600.3* 1808
ITEXPGR -0.01051 2.391994 -4.056758 0.275857 -1.848721 40.66897 107924.2* 1808
ITRCPTGR -0.00541 3.486144 -3.693053 0.287256 -0.927068 39.35676 99835.66* 1808
Democratic (66) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 2914.466 34378.9 125.267 5270.849 3.547442 16.6335 5354.087* 544
ITARR 0.874653 103.5508 0.001814 4.748821 18.82236 403.5606 3668960* 544
ITEXP 2662.718 1298055 1.216888 55655.98 23.24171 541.4484 6620648* 544
ITRCPT 910.451 310652.3 0.211532 13324.07 23.15748 538.8291 6556512* 544
GDPPCGR 0.03672 0.322496 -0.155308 0.044906 0.688853 10.09238 1113.6* 512
ITARRGR -0.040458 1.285837 -3.187505 0.334261 -3.505746 32.99917 20247.7* 512
ITEXPGR -0.042826 1.597482 -4.056758 0.380428 -2.677258 29.33492 15406.91* 512
ITRCPTGR -0.025152 3.486144 -3.693053 0.420858 -0.606085 26.3205 11633.39* 512
Non–democratic (32) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 5627.282 37582.7 203.053 7428.607 2.834821 10.96911 2642.375* 663
ITARR 0.446066 21.86591 0.001305 1.203505 11.69013 177.1885 853288.5* 663
ITEXP 195.5019 4556.744 0.931889 356.0236 5.448195 47.07758 56950.71* 663
ITRCPT 266.3676 6726.391 1.351238 462.8785 6.816638 76.60701 154806.6* 663
GDPPCGR 0.027245 0.150109 -0.192922 0.040107 -0.97212 6.514741 419.4704* 624
ITARRGR -0.034254 0.768641 -2.289284 0.206598 -3.025277 29.18194 18774.69* 624
ITEXPGR -0.000734 2.391994 -2.23065 0.266079 1.106608 29.7708 18760.93* 624
ITRCPTGR -0.00225 1.704141 -2.398752 0.257225 -1.232902 20.37821 8010.138* 624
GDPPC, ITARR, ITEXP and ITRCPT , denote per capita per capita real GDP (in 2005 US$), per capita
tourist arrivals, per capita tourism expenditures, and per capita international tourism receipts, respectively, and
GDPPCGR, ITARRGR, ITEXPGR and ITRCPTGR are the aforementioned series’ growth rates (i.e. first
difference of natural logarithm). JB denote Jarque-Bera. * indicates 1 percent level of significance.
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